Declared, Documented or Verified? How Foreign Capital Reads a Greek Investment Proposal

An international investor can only underwrite what is in the file. Every statement in a Greek investment proposal sits in one of three states: declared by the project sponsor, documented by evidence the sponsor holds, or verified by a third party the investor can check directly. The distance between the first and the third is usually the distance between a proposal that gets read and one that gets funded.

This article expands on «Δηλώνεται, τεκμηριώνεται ή επαληθεύεται;», an opinion piece by Athanasios Aggelakakis, founder of Aggelakakis & Associates, published in Capital.gr on 7 October 2026. The original was written for Greek business owners preparing investment projects. This version is written for the other side of the table: the investor in Frankfurt, London, New Jersey or Mumbai who sees the project only through its documents.

Interest is no longer the constraint

For years, every discussion about investing in Greece ended with the same question: is there real interest from abroad? The 2025 data answers it. According to Bank of Greece figures published by Enterprise Greece, net FDI inflows reached €11,380 million in 2025, against €7,015 million in 2024, an increase of 62.2%.

The headline needs two qualifiers. First, the 2025 figure is provisional. Second, a large share of recent inflows has been driven by a small number of very large transactions, notably in energy, as reported in coverage of the Bank of Greece data. Record inflows into large acquisitions do not mean that a mid-sized hotel, manufacturing or agrifood project will find a foreign co-investor. What the figure does show is that capital is looking. The burden has shifted to the projects: are they ready to be looked at?

The evidence ladder: declared, documented, verified

Every item in an investment proposal, from demand and permits to supplier agreements and construction cost, sits on one rung of a three-step ladder.

• Declared. The sponsor states it, and nothing in the file supports it. Example: “demand in the area is strong.” A declared claim is not necessarily wrong; it simply carries no weight yet.
• Documented. A document exists that the sponsor produced, commissioned or holds: a market study, a contractor’s quotation, a filed permit application, a letter of intent. Its credibility still depends on who prepared it, and for whom.
• Verified. A third party outside the sponsor’s control confirms it, and the investor can check it directly, without going through the sponsor: an issued permit, a Land Registry extract, a binding contract confirmed by the counterparty, a third-party cost review, a decision of inclusion under the Development Law.

Each step up the ladder reduces the information an investor has to take on trust. Each step also costs time and money, which is why most proposals stop at “documented” and present it as if it were “verified”.

The question of who prepared a document, and for whom, matters more than it first appears. It is where the incentive problem discussed later in this article begins.

How a foreign investor reads the file

The table below applies the ladder to the four examples used in the original article: demand, permits, supplier agreements and construction cost. It is illustrative, not exhaustive, and the right evidence varies by sector and scheme.

Item	Declared	Documented	Verified
Demand	“Demand in the area is strong”	Market study commissioned by the sponsor; non-binding letters of intent	Signed offtake or lease agreements confirmed by the counterparty; audited trading history
Permits	“Licensing is a formality”	Filed permit applications; consultant’s timeline	Issued permits, checkable in the public register, with appeal periods expired where applicable
Supplier agreements	“We have agreed terms”	Draft contracts; correspondence; a signed contract the investor cannot confirm	Binding contract confirmed by the counterparty or registered
Construction cost	“Around €4 million”	Contractor’s quotation	Binding fixed-price offer with a third-party cost review

A useful exercise before any investor meeting: label every material statement in the proposal as declared, documented or verified. If the items that drive valuation are mostly declared, the proposal is not ready, however long it is.

On state aid specifically: grants under Greece’s Development Law (Law 4887/2022, as amended by Law 5203/2025 (GG A’ 87/02.06.2025) and Law 5297/2026 (GG A’ 64/28.04.2026)) depend on the scheme, the region and the size of the enterprise. In competitive calls, they also depend on the project’s score against published criteria. “Eligible” is a declared state. Only a decision of inclusion is verified.

Why the gap costs more with foreign capital

A Greek bank or a Greek co-investor usually has information that never appears in any file: the company’s reputation in its market, local knowledge, and the ability to visit the site or call a supplier the next day. They can fill gaps in a proposal informally. An investor reviewing the same project from London or Frankfurt cannot.

Economists have studied this problem for more than fifty years. In 1970, George Akerlof published “The Market for ‘Lemons'”, an analysis of the used-car market. If buyers cannot tell a good car from a bad one, they offer an average price. Owners of good cars then have no reason to sell, they withdraw, and the market fills with “lemons”. The paper became a foundation of the economics of asymmetric information, the field for which Akerlof shared the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences with Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz.

The theory was not written for investment files, but the logic transfers directly. When a proposal rests mainly on declarations, the reader has few ways to separate an excellent project from a mediocre one, and treats both with similar caution. The practical cost is rarely an outright rejection. It is a higher required return, a lower valuation, tougher terms or a longer diligence period. The best-prepared sponsors bear that cost most, because they are being priced as average.

Michael Spence’s work on signalling suggests the way out: someone with a genuinely good asset can show it in a way a careless competitor cannot easily copy. Applied to investment proposals, the signal that counts is evidence that survives third-party verification. Volume is easy to imitate. Verified evidence is not.

“International private capital does not need more investment proposals. It needs better-prepared ones.”

— Athanasios Aggelakakis, Capital.gr, 7 October 2026

That conclusion came out of conversations with family offices, private banks and investment funds at the European Private Wealth Excellence Forum in Athens in September 2026. It was also where Aggelakakis & Associates first presented the Aggelakakis 360° publicly. The opportunities exist. The question is the condition in which they arrive.

Who profits from the “yes”?

Before a major capital decision, investors consult many people: advisers, banks, brokers. They rarely ask the question that matters most: what would each of them gain or lose by saying “no”?

In 1976, Michael Jensen and William Meckling analysed the costs that arise when someone acts on behalf of another party while holding different interests of their own: agency costs. Their work concerned shareholders, managers and lenders inside the firm. The same conflict of incentives appears in advisory work. When the person saying “yes” benefits from the “yes”, the cost of any divergence usually falls on the client, often without the client noticing.

This does not mean the assessment must be done by a different firm. It means the assessment must be structured so that it can genuinely end in “no”. Three tests are useful:

1. Fixed fee. The assessment fee is agreed in advance and does not depend on whether financing is approved or the transaction closes.
2. Criteria set in advance. The assessment follows its own criteria, known before the work starts, not criteria adjusted to the conclusion.
3. Separation of mandates. If an implementation mandate follows, it is separate, on separate terms, and cannot retroactively change the assessment’s findings.

A careful investor will ask who prepared the file and on what terms. The answer should exist before the question is asked.

The Aggelakakis 360° is performed for a fixed fee agreed in advance, which does not depend on the finding, on whether financing is approved or on whether the transaction closes; any subsequent implementation mandate is a separate engagement, on separate terms, and cannot alter the assessment’s finding. The assessment ends in a graded verdict from GO to NO-GO, and a documented No-Go conclusion counts as full performance of the mandate.

Which capital, for which project

Greek projects can draw on several sources of financing: bank debt, the Development Law, EU programmes, own funds, private equity and strategic investors. They are often considered one at a time, starting from whichever programme happens to be open. The more useful question is which combination fits this project, at this stage, and the objectives of these shareholders. The firm’s guide to investing in Greece as a foreign company covers the structures and instruments in more detail.

One point gets less attention than it deserves. Equity is usually the most expensive capital a business can raise, and it becomes more expensive when the business does not need it. A new shareholder brings money, but also changes ownership, governance and, sooner or later, strategic direction. Before signing, the sponsor has options and negotiating power. After signing, both shrink. Governance and exit terms are therefore best agreed before the investor enters, while there is still room to say “no”.

What this framework does not do

No assessment framework, however strict, eliminates risk. The limits are worth stating plainly:

• Verification is a snapshot. A verified permit can be challenged, a binding cost offer can be renegotiated after a supply shock, and a counterparty can default. Verified means checked at a date, not guaranteed for the life of the project.
• The rules move. The Development Law itself was amended twice between 2025 and 2026. Any evidence tied to a scheme must be re-checked against the rules in force when capital is committed.
• Verifiers can be wrong. Third-party evidence reduces asymmetry; it does not remove the need for the investor’s own judgement.
• Readiness does not predict approval. A well-evidenced project can still lose a competitive call, miss a budget allocation or fail to attract the right investor at the right time.

What a rigorous framework can do is reduce the avoidable errors and make room for a “not yet” at the point where it costs least: before signing. In practice, an early “not yet” is often the most useful answer an investor or sponsor can get.

A pre-submission checklist

1. Which statements drive the valuation, and which rung of the ladder is each one on?
2. Could an investor confirm each “verified” item directly, without going through the sponsor?
3. Is any state aid presented as received when it is only eligible or applied for?
4. Does the cost base rest on a quotation or on a binding offer with a third-party cost review?
5. Who prepared the file, for whom, and does their fee depend on the outcome?
6. Have governance and exit terms been defined before discussing equity?
7. What would make the answer “not yet”, and has anyone checked?

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between documented and verified evidence in an investment proposal?

Documented evidence is a document the sponsor produced, commissioned or holds, such as a market study or a contractor’s quotation; its credibility depends on who prepared it, and for whom. Verified evidence is confirmed by a third party outside the sponsor’s control, and the investor can check it directly: for example an issued permit, a Land Registry extract or a binding contract confirmed by the counterparty.

Why do foreign investors discount Greek investment proposals?

Foreign investors lack the informal local context Greek lenders rely on. When they cannot separate strong proposals from weak ones, they price both cautiously, through higher required returns, lower valuations or tougher terms. This is the information asymmetry problem described by George Akerlof in 1970.

How much foreign direct investment did Greece receive in 2025?

Net FDI inflows into Greece reached €11,380 million in 2025, compared with €7,015 million in 2024, an increase of 62.2%, according to provisional Bank of Greece data published by Enterprise Greece.

Is a Development Law grant “verified” once the application is submitted?

No. A submitted application is documented evidence. Grants under Law 4887/2022, as amended by Law 5203/2025 and Law 5297/2026, depend on the scheme, region, enterprise size and, in competitive calls, the project’s score. Only an issued decision of inclusion is verified.

Does an investment readiness assessment have to come from a different firm?

Not necessarily. It has to be structured so it can conclude “no”: a fixed fee agreed in advance that does not depend on the outcome, criteria set in advance, and any implementation mandate kept separate from the assessment’s finding.

Does a positive readiness assessment guarantee financing or grant approval?

No. An assessment reduces avoidable errors and information gaps. It does not remove market, regulatory or counterparty risk, and it does not determine the outcome of a competitive call or an investor’s decision.

About the author

Athanasios Aggelakakis is the founder of Aggelakakis & Associates, an investment advisory firm headquartered in Thessaloniki that works with international investors entering Greece. The original Greek-language article was published in Capital.gr on 7 October 2026.

Sources

• Aggelakakis, A. (2026). «Δηλώνεται, τεκμηριώνεται ή επαληθεύεται;». Capital.gr, 7 October 2026.
• Bank of Greece data, as published by Enterprise Greece — Foreign Direct Investments (2025 provisional).
• Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488–500. doi:10.2307/1879431
• Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355–374. doi:10.2307/1882010
• Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. doi:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
• The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2001, NobelPrize.org.

This article is general information. It is not legal, tax or investment advice, and no financing, approval or outcome is promised. Regulatory references reflect the rules in force at the date of publication and should be confirmed against official sources before any decision.